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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff/appellee Brown (hereafter "Brown") submits the 
following in addition to the arguments contained in the brief of 
appellee CCC&T, Inc. ("CCC&T"), with which Brown concurs and to 
which arguments Brown subscribes and incorporates by this 
reference. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (Supp. 1991); Utah R. App. P. 3. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Brown is dissatisfied1 with appellant's statement of the 
issues in that appellant reads the order appealed from, and thus 
the issues on appeal, too broadly. Brown concurs in the statement 
of the issues stated by CCC&T. 
Because this is an issue of statutory interpretation, it 
presents a question of law which this court reviews for 
correctness. Sneddon v. Graham, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 14 (Ct. 
App. 1991) (citing Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231, 233 
(Utah App. 1991)). 
Brown, like CCC&T, will not address the issue of indemnity 
between appellant and its co-defendant Bowman & Kemp Steel Supply 
Co., Inc. 
'See, Utah R. App. P. 24(b). 
1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The statutes upon which this issue turns are: 
Utah Workers/ Compensation Act. §§ 35-1-1 et seq., U.C.A. 
1. § 35-1-60, U.C.A. Exclusive remedy against employer, or 
officer, agent or employee—Occupational disease excepted. 
2. § 35-1-62, U.C.A. Injuries or death caused by wrongful 
acts of persons other than employer, officer, agent, or 
employee of said employer, officer, agent, or employee of said 
employer—Rights of employer or insurance carrier in cause of 
action—Notice of intention to proceed against third party— 
Right to maintain action not involving employee-employers 
relationship—Disbursement of proceeds of recovery. 
These statutory provisions are reproduced as Addendum 1 
attached hereto. 
Utah Liability Reform Act. S 78-27-37 to S 78-27-43, U.C.A. 
(1986) 
1. § 78-27-37, U.C.A. Definitions. 
2. § 78-27-38, U.C.A. Comparative negligence. 
3. § 78-27-39, U.C.A. Separate special verdicts on total 
damages and proportion of fault. 
4. § 78-27-40, U.C.A. Amount of liability limited to 
proportion of fault—No contribution. 
5. § 78-27-41, U.C.A. Joinder of defendants. 
6. § 78-27-42, U.C.A. Release to one defendant does not 
discharge other defendants. 
7. § 78-27-43, U.C.A. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, 
indemnity, contribution• 
These statutory provisions are reproduced as Addendum 2, 
attached hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Brown is satisfied with the statement of the case set forth by 
appellant. To avoid unnecessary repetition, Brown concurs in and 
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incorporates by this reference the statement of facts set out by 
CCC&T. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Compensation 
Act of Utah, Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-1, et seq. (1988) render 
Brown's employer, CCC&T, immune from suit* The plain language of 
the Liability Reform Act of 1986, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 
through 43 (1987) is clear and unambiguous. It expressly 
recognizes the employer's immunity and precludes naming an immune 
entity such as the employer as a party to this action, whether for 
purposes of obtaining a recovery or having "fault" compared with 
that of defendants. For the same reasons, the employer may not be 
included on the jury verdict form as a non-party for such fault 
comparison. 
Even if construed to be ambiguous, the legislative intent 
behind the Liability Reform Act clearly supports the conclusion 
that immune parties such as employers were not contemplated to be 
among those whose fault is to be compared pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-39. To give this act the effect intended by the 
legislature, this Court must uphold the trial court's order. 
Any argument by appellant that the trial court's order may be 
interpreted to preclude argument that the employer's conduct is 
either an intervening or superseding cause is harmless error. 
Besides the fact the parties do not interpret the order that way, 
the evidence fails to support a claim that the employer's conduct 
was an intervening or superseding cause. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Liability Reform Act of 1986 precludes the 
relief sought by appellant. 
A. The plain language of the statute prevents the result 
sought by appellant. 
This Court has recently reiterated the rules of statutory 
construction. "The general rule of statutory construction is that 
where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we do not 
look beyond the language's plain meaning to divine legislative 
intent." Horton v. The Royal Order of the Sun, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. 
4, 5 (1991) (citations omitted). See also, Sneddon v. Graham, 175 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. 
The language of this statute is clear and unambiguous. The 
terms "defendant" and "person seeking recovery" are defined by 
section 372. Neither definition extends to employers. 
A defendant is any person "not immune from suit who is claimed 
to be liable because of fault. . ." An employer, whose immunity is 
expressly preserved in section 43, cannot fit that description.3 
Nor is the employer claimed to be liable because of fault. 
Indeed, the appellant does not claim the employer is liable (i.e., 
answerable in damages) at all. Further, as CCC&T establishes at 
length, the employer cannot be claimed liable because of fault, 
which is defined in section 37 as an "actionable breach of duty..." 
The employer, subject to the statutory obligations of the worker's 
2Except otherwise noted, all section references are to Utah 
Code Ann. Title 78, Chapter 27 (1987). 
3The employer is likewise not a person seeking recovery, nor 
does appellant claim it to be. 
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compensation laws without consideration of fault, is not subject to 
an "actionable" duty and therefor cannot commit an "actionable 
breach of duty." 
Section 39 provides that a jury's determination of comparative 
fault extends to a consideration of "the percentage or proportion 
of fault attributable to each person seeking recovery and to each 
defendant." These terms are clearly defined in the Act and, as 
noted above, exclude employers. The clear and unambiguous language 
of the Act itself therefore precludes the relief sought by 
appellant. The trial court's order should be upheld. 
B. The legislative intent behind the enactment of the 
Liability Reform Act reinforces the reading of it to preclude 
comparison of the employer's fault. 
Even if the statute were to be viewed as ambiguous and 
requiring reference to extrinsic information for interpretation, 
see, Horton, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. at 5, the history of the passage of 
this act supports the conclusion that the employer is not among 
those whose conduct is to be considered by the jury. As noted by 
CCC&T, the legislation enacted as the Liability Reform Act was a 
substitute bill, which replaced Senate Bill (S.B.) 64. A draft of 
S.B. 64 proposed that section 39 permit comparison of the fault of 
each person seeking recovery, each defendant and each other person 
whose fault contributed to the injury or damages. See, Substitute 
S.B. 64 dated January 31, 1986 (attached as Addendum 3) (emphasis 
added)• 
This language, which arguably would have permitted the very 
sort of comparison sought by appellant, was deleted in the final 
5 
version of S.B. 64 which was ultimately enacted into the statute 
now before the Court. Other provisions of the legislation remained 
unchanged. This change was an advised one. 
Senator Kay Cornaby, Chairman of the State and Local Committee 
considering the bill, reported the final bill out of committee 
under cover of a letter stating that the committee had "carefully 
considered" the bill.4 The committee recommended that the 
substitute bill replace the original and be amended to delete the 
expansive third category of persons (i.e., "other person[s] whose 
fault contributed to the injury or damages") from comparison of 
fault by the jury. This recommendation was accepted and the final 
version passed without provision for comparison of the fault of 
others. This clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative 
intent ought not to be frustrated as appellant seeks. 
II. Any claim by appellant that the trial court's order 
precludes it from arguing superseding or 
intervening cause is harmless error. 
Appellant contends that the trial court's order is erroneous 
because it precludes the appellant from arguing that the injury was 
the result of an intervening or superseding cause. This argument 
is fatuous. As noted by CCC&T in its brief, the appellant 
misconstrues the order. Neither Brown nor CCC&T construe the order 
to so constrain appellant. 
However, even were the order so interpreted, the error would 
be harmless. The evidence before the court does not lend itself to 
4Senator Cornaby's letter is attached as Addendum 4. 
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a conclusion that an intervening or superseding cause was 
operating. At best, the evidence might be interpreted to show a 
concurrent cause, but that would neither preclude a finding that 
appellant's conduct was a proximate cause of the injury nor 
eliminate appellant's liability. 
There may be more than one proximate cause. George v. LDS 
Hospital, 797 P.2d 1117# 1122 (Utah App. 1990). "A person's 
negligence is not superseded by the negligence of another if the 
subsequent negligence of another is foreseeable." Harris v. Utah 
Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah 1983). One is not 
excused from liability merely because the later negligence of 
another concurs to cause injury, if the later conduct was 
foreseeable. Id. at 220 (citations omitted). 
In the instant case, Brown contends that the appellant, 
Jacobsen-Robbins Construction Co., negligently failed to erect the 
safety cable as was its responsibility. Appellant seeks to argue 
that the employer was negligent in not properly instructing its 
employees to weld from the outer edge in or to otherwise avoid the 
building edges. Even if that were so (which Brown in no way 
concedes), such a failure by the employer cannot be claimed to be 
so "'extraordinary' as to be unforeseeable," id., and is therefore 
not a superseding or intervening cause. Therefore, even if the 
trial court's order is defective, the defect is harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly determined that under the Liability 
Reform Act of 1986 employers and other immune persons are not to be 
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considered by the jury for purposes of fault comparison, whether 
made parties or not. This Court should uphold that construction of 
the act and affirm the lower court's order dismissing the third 
party complaint against the employer and precluding consideration 
of the employer's "negligence," if any, by the jury* 
DATED this 5th day of February, 1992. 
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING 
war^S .^favas 
Attoamey for P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l e e 
Daniel C. Brown 
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ADDENDUM 1 
S 35-1-60 Utah Code Annotated 
and 
§ 35-1-62 Utah Code Annotated 
35-1-60 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Notice and opportunity to be heard. commission, whose award has been annulled, 
This section inferentially at least provides cannot amend its findings of facts without giv-
that the commission shall give notice and an ing employer notice and an opportunity to be 
opportunity to be heard to all persons whose heard. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Industrial 
rights may be affected by its award. Therefore, Comm'n, 74 Utah 316, 279 P. 612 (1929). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 638. *= 1765. 
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, 
agent or employee — Occupational disease ex-
cepted. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for 
injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be 
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy 
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of 
the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil 
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his 
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal rep-
resentatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of any 
accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or 
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his 
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or 
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any acci-
dent, injury or death of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall 
prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the indus-
trial commission of Utah for compensation in those cases within the provi-
sions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 76; C.L. 1917, Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law, 
§ 3132; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. § 35-2-1 et seq. 
1943, 42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52, § 1. Meaning of "this act". — See the note un-
Cross-References. — Employment of chil- der the same catchline following § 35-1-46. 
dren, § 34-23-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Compulsory. 
Effect of no-fault insurance. 
Employer. 
Exclusiveness of remedy. 
—Minor engaged in hazardous employment. 
Farmers and domestics. 
Hospital charges. 
Indemnification agreement between employer and third party. 
Indemnity agreement. 
Intentional tort. 
Joint venture. 
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to third parties, 
id adequacy of act. 
injury by employee of same employer. 
>nal disease. 
employer 
ent control." 
ictor's employee, 
ility of employer, 
rapacity" doctrine. 
lory. 
Workmen's Compensation Act is com-
ind not elective. Lovato v. Beatrice 
! Utah 2d 371, 453 P.2d 692 (1969). 
f no-fault insurance. 
Vo-Fault Insurance Act, former 
et seq., did not supersede or nullify 
unen's Compensation Act's exclusive 
mmsion as applied to injuries from 
hide accidents suffered in the course 
pment. IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 
296 (Utah 1975) 
jr. 
r was employee of cable television 
, its subsidiary, and its limited part-
tirposes of the exclusive remedy prow 
the Utah Workmen's Compensation 
re the cable television company, as 
A management style, grouped all em-
together under its direct control and 
le worker's time sheets and checks 
uiaged by the cable television com-
eund v. Utah Power & Light, 625 F 
>2 <D. Utah 1985). 
treness of remedy. 
this section when the injury is caused 
sghgent act of the employer, no willful 
net being claimed, the injured em-
r, when the injury causes death, his 
tits, must be content to accept the com-
n provided by the act. Hailing v In-
Comm'n, 71 Utah 112, 263 P. 78 
the enactment of the Workmen's Com-
n Act in 1917, the exclusive remedy of 
oyee who is injured in the course of his 
lent is the nght to recover the compen-
rovided for in the act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.) 
v. Wasatch Grading Co., 73 Utah 430, 
940 (1929); Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet 
sundry, 108 Utah 1, 156 P2d 885 
>yee of railroad was not precluded from 
aim for compensation by application 
der Federal Employers' Liability Act 
nd of election since employee did not 
o remedies but only one; if injury was 
i while he was engaged in interstate 
ce, his remedy was under Federal Em-
Liabihty Act and if not, it was under 
state act. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 84 Utah 364, 35 P.2d 842, 94 A.L.R. 
1423 (1934). 
This section abrogates employee's common-
law nght to sue employer for injuries suffered 
while in course of employment, except where 
employer is not subject to this act or common-
law remedy of employee is expressly reserved. 
Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Min-
ing Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, appeal 
dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S. Ct. 138, 93 L. 
Ed. 411 (1948) 
This section makes it clear that this chapter 
is the exclusive vehicle for recovery of compen-
sation for injury or death, against the employer 
and other employees to the exclusion of any 
and all other civil liability whatsover, at com-
mon law or otherwise, and that it bars all next 
of kin or dependents, or anyone else, from 
using any other means of recovery against em-
ployers and others named in and covered by 
the Act, than the Act itself. Momll v. J & M 
Constr. Co., 635 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981). 
— Minor engaged in hazardous employ-
ment. 
Even if a minor employee is injured while 
engaged in hazardous employment in violation 
of § 34-23-2, prohibiting the employment of 
minors in hazardous occupations, the minor's 
exclusive remedy is through this chapter, and 
the minor cannot void her employment con-
tract and sue in tort. Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 
707 P 2d 678 (Utah 1985) 
Farmers and domestics. 
Farm laborers and domestic servants, in the 
event of an accident or injury, are entitled to 
pursue their common-law remedies in an ac-
tion against the employer because they are ex-
cepted from the act by §§ 35-1-42 and 35-1-43. 
Murray v Strike, 76 Utah 118, 287 P. 922 
(1930) 
Hospital charges. 
The only power given the Industrial Com-
mission by the workers' compensation statutes 
over hospital charges for services rendered to 
injured employees is the nght to refuse to pay 
that part of them which is excessive in amount 
or for care which was not reasonably neces-
sary; Industrial Commission does not have the 
power and authority to set maximum rates 
191 
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which hospitals may charge for services ren-
dered injured employees, and hospitals are not 
prohibited from holding an injured employee 
liable for any amounts not paid by the commis-
sion. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1289 (Utah 1982). 
Indemnification agreement between em-
ployer and third party. 
Where employer and third party voluntarily 
enter into a written indemnification agree-
ment whereby the employer agrees to indem-
nify the third party against claims arising out 
of injuries to the employer's employees, and 
where an employee is injured and is compen-
sated by the employer in accordance with the 
workers' compensation law, the exclusive rem-
edy provision of this section does not preclude 
the enforcement of the indemnification agree-
ment by the third party against the employer 
for amounts paid by the third party to the em-
ployee as a result of the injury. Shell Oil Co. v. 
Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187 
(Utah 1983). 
Indemnity agreement 
An indemnity agreement is a separate un-
dertaking by the employer that will be enforce-
able despite workers' compensation if the in-
demnity provision expressly covers the indem-
nitor's employees, but the phrase "person or 
persons" does not cover indemnitor's own em-
ployees given the dramatic consequences of 
such an interpretation. Wollam v. Kennecott 
Corp., 663 F. Supp. 268 (D. Utah 1987). 
Intentional tort 
Provision prohibiting action for damages 
against fellow employee does not prohibit 
maintenance of action for premeditated and in-
tentional act of fellow employee. Bryan v. Utah 
Int'l, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975). 
Joint venture. 
Construction company obtained contract to 
construct diversion tunnel at dam and entered 
into agreement with corporation by which the 
two organizations would unite their efforts to 
complete such construction and share in profits 
or losses from the enterprise. Miner, hired by 
the construction company, who was injured 
while working on the tunnel and who obtained 
workmen's compensation benefits, could not 
sue corporation for alleged negligence of corpo-
rate employees since the two companies were 
regarded as the employing unit. The employees 
of both companies were engaged in the same 
employment. Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15 
Utah 2d 20, 386 P.2d 616 (1963). 
This section barred suit by workmen against 
joint venturer which was his employer for inju-
ries sustained in use of machine furnished by a 
second joint venturer, where machine was fur-
nished pursuant to contract creating the joint 
venture. Hammer v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 29 
t Utah 2d 415, 510 P.2d 1104 (1973). 
5
 Liability to third parties. 
Where plaintiff employee was injured when 
a fellow employee drove the truck in which 
they were nding into the side of a train, and 
brought an action against the railroad and the 
manufacturer of the crossing signal, alleging 
r negligent upkeep and product defect, respec-
tively, neither defendant could join plaintiffs 
employer as a third-party defendant in order to 
I assert a claim for contribution from it under 
1 the joint tort-feasor statute. Curtis v. Harmon 
. Elec, Inc., 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976); Phillips 
5 v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 1980) 
* (decided under prior law). 
- Nature and adequacy of act. 
The workers' compensation scheme is purely 
r
 statutory, and the act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.) pro-
vides a plain, speedy, and adequate method of 
review. Woldberg v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 
r
 Utah 309, 279 P. 609 (1929). 
Negligent injury by employee of same em-
ployer. 
Where subcontractor was an "employee" of 
contractor, other employee of contractor could 
not maintain negligence action against subcon-
tractor but must look to workers' compensation 
insurance. Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 
• 139, 442 P.2d 31 (1968). 
Occupational disease. 
Administratrix of deceased city employee, 
who died from inhalation of paint he was or-
dered to spray on trucks, could bring an action 
i at law against the employer, since such was 
not an accidental injury compensable under 
this act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.), but was an "occupa-
tional disease." Young v. Salt Lake City, 97 
Utah 123, 90 P.2d 174 (1939). 
Statutory employer. 
—"Sufficient control." 
Where joint owners of interests in oil and gas 
leases provided for construction of a gas pro-
cessing plant located in Utah, to be operated as 
a "mutually profitable venture" for the purpose 
of extracting liquid hydrocarbons, and under 
the operating agreement the owners reserved 
the power of ultimate control over the project 
and over the operator thereof, the owners re-
tained "sufficient control" to qualify as statu-
tory employers of an employee of the operator 
pursuant to § 35-1-42(2) and the exclusive 
remedy provision of this section applied Lamb 
v. W-Energy, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah 
1987). 
Subcontractor 's employee. 
Subcontractor's employee could not recover 
from general contractor in civil action for inju-
ries on theory that subcontractor was his em-
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T and general contractor was a third per-
lot in the same employment. Smith v Al-
Brown Co., 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P 2d 994 
2) 
us section does not forbid or render invalid 
use in a construction subcontract by which 
subcontractor agreed to indemnify the 
ie contractor and save him harmless for all 
hty arising out of the injury or death of an 
loyee of subcontractor, where such clause 
ted and decedent workman's administra-
sued pnme contractor for wrongful death 
lecedent and recovered; therefore, dece-
t's employer is required to reimburse pnme 
xactor covered by workmen's compensation 
provided in such indemnity clause. Titan 
»i Corp. v. Walton, 365 F 2d 542 (10th Cir 
6) 
-t liability of employer. 
"Dual capacity" doctrine. 
ftah law does not recognize as an exception 
the exclusive remedy provisions of the 
rker's Compensation Act, the so-called 
tal capacity" doctrine under which an em-
yer, shielded from tort liability by the act, 
y become liable in tort if he occupies, in ad-
ion to his capacity as employer, a second ca-
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah Al-
vs Contribution Against Co-tortfeasor De-
ite Immunity from District Suit Bishop v 
elsen, 1982 B.Y.U.L. Rev 429 
C.J.S. — 101 C J S. Workmen's Compensa-
>n § 918. 
A.L.R. — Insured's receipt of or right to 
jrkmen's compensation benefits as affecting 
covery under accident, hospital, or medical 
pense policy, 40 A L R 3d 1012 
Workers' compensation law as precluding 
5-1-61. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 35-1-61 (C. 1943, Supp , 
2-1-57-10, enacted by L 1945, ch 65, § 2), 
slating to injuries to or death of illegally em-
pacity that confers on him an obligation inde-
pendent of those imposed on him as an em-
ployer Worthen v Kennecott Corp., 780 F.2d 
856 (10th Cir. 1985) 
An employee cannot hold his employer liable 
in tort for injuries resulting from the em-
ployer's maintenance of unsafe premises, on 
the reasoning that the employer occupies a sep-
arate capacity and owes separate duties to his 
employees as an owner of the premises, since 
the employer's duty to maintain a safe work-
place is inseparable from the employer's gen-
eral duties as an employer toward his em-
ployees. Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d 
678 (Utah 1985). 
The dual capacity doctrine did not apply to a 
products liability claim brought on behalf of a 
decedent who was killed when he was pulled 
into a large screw-auger manufactured by de-
fendant while decedent was working on his em-
ployer's premises, where the employer had not 
assumed a separate and distinct obligation to-
ward his employee other than as employer. 
Stewart v CMI Corp, 740 P 2d 1340 (Utah 
1987) 
Cited in Smith v Atlantic Richfield Co., 814 
F2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1987). 
employee's suit against employer for third per-
son's criminal attack, 49 A.L.R.4th 926. 
Workers' compensation act as precluding 
tort action for injury to or death of employee's 
unborn child, 55 A.L.R.4th 792. 
Willful, wanton, or reckless conduct of coem-
ployee as ground of liability despite bar of 
workers' compensation law, 57 A.L.R.4th 888 
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
*» 2084 
ployed minor, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 
76, » 11 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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35-1-59. Docketing awards in district court — Enforcing 
judgment. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
Commission's order finding an uninsured 
employer liable for benefits paid to an injured 
employee by the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
was affirmed with the direction that the fund 
would have to seek satisfaction of the em-
ployer's obligation through proceedings in the 
district court under this section. Thomas A. 
Paulsen Co. v. Industrial Comm'nt 770 P2d 
125 (Utah 1989). 
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, 
agent or employee — Occupational disease ex-
cepted. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Exclusiveness of remedy. 
Federal law 
Indemnification agreement between employer 
and third party. 
Intentional tort. 
Statutory employer. 
Exclusiveness of remedy. 
Former county employee's claims against the 
county or against individual co-employees 
based on negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress or otherwise based upon negligence were 
barred by the exclusive remedy provision of 
this section. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 735 
F. Supp. 381 (D. Utah 1990). 
Federal law. 
Federal government employee was barred 
from bringing negligence suit against a fellow 
employee where, under federal law, the em-
ployee's exclusive remedy was against the 
United States and she had filed for and re-
ceived benefits from the United States govern-
ment. Hope v Berrett, 756 P.2d 102 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Indemnification agreement between em-
ployer and third party. 
The exclusive remedy provision of this sec-
tion bars a claim by a third party that a statu-
tory employer impliedly agreed to mdemmfy 
the third party against claims for injuries sus-
tained by an employee. Freund v. Utah Power 
& Light Co., 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990). 
Intentional tort. 
An employee who, in the course and scope of 
his or her employment, intentionally acts to 
injure a co-worker is not protected by the ex-
clusivity provision from a separate action at 
law for damages. But, in such a case, the em-
ployer is liable only to the extent of workers' 
compensation benefits unless the injurious act 
was directed or intended by the employer 795 
P2d 1138 (Utah 1990), cert, granted, 
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co , 773 P 2d 
405 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Requiring an injured employee to show that 
his employer or fellow employee manifested a 
deliberate intent to injure him before allowing 
an exception to the statute for an intentional 
tort is fully consistent with the purpose of the 
workers' compensation act. Knowledge to a 
substantial certainty that injury will follow is 
not sufficient to invoke the exception. Lantz v 
National Semiconductor Corp., 775 P2d 937 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
Statutory employer. 
The legislature has, in clear and unmistak-
able language, evinced an intention to allow 
suits by an injured worker against those per-
sons who might be his or her statutory em-
ployers as defined in § 35-1-42. The immedi-
ate, or common-law, employer, who actually 
pays compensation, and its officers, agents, 
and employees are shielded by the exclusive 
remedy immunity conferred by this section. 
Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428 
(Utah 1989). 
The decision in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 
777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989), holding that the 
state Workers' Compensation Act should no 
longer be construed to provide tort immunity 
to statutory employers who have not been re-
quired to pay benefits thereunder to the in-
jured worker, should be given retroactive ef-
fect. Lamb v. W-Energy, Inc., 884 F 2d 1349 
(10th Cir. 1989) (reversing Lamb v. W-Energy, 
Inc., 663 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah 1987), which 
appears under this catchline in bound volume) 
A worker can sue a statutory employer who 
has not been required to pay workers' compen-
sation benefits, and the latter is not protected 
by the immunity afforded by this section. 
Bosch v Busch Development, Inc., 777 P2d 
431 (Utah 1989). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — "Dual capacity doctrine" as basis 
for employee's recovery for medical malprac-
tice from company medical personnel, 73 
A.L.R.4th 115. 
Workers' compensation: third-party tort lia-
bility of corporate officer to injured workers, 76 
A.L.R.4th 365. 
Workers' compensation statute as barring il-
legally employed minor's tort action, 77 
A.L.R.4th 844. 
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of per-
sons other than employer, officer, agent, or em-
ployee of said employer — Rights of employer or 
insurance carrier in cause of action — Mainte-
nance of action — Notice of intention to proceed 
against third party — Right to maintain action 
not involving employee-employer relationship — 
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery, 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Statutory employers. 
The legislature has, in clear and unmistak-
able language, evinced an intention to allow 
suits by an injured worker against those per-
sons who might be his or her statutory em-
ployers as defined in § 35-1-42. The immedi-
ate, or common-law, employer, who actually 
pays compensation, and its officers, agents, 
and employees are shielded by the exclusive 
remedy immunity conferred by § 35-1-60. Pate 
v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428 (Utah 
1989). 
The decision in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 
777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989), holding that the 
state Workers' Compensation Act should no 
longer be construed to provide tort immunity 
to statutory employers who have not been re-
quired to pay benefits thereunder to the in-
jured worker, should be given retroactive ef-
fect. Lamb v. W-Energy, Inc., 884 F.2d 1349 
(10th Cir. 1989) (reversing Lamb v. W-Energy, 
IncM 663 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah 1987), which 
appears under "Applicability of section" catch-
line in bound volume). 
A worker can sue a statutory employer who 
has not been required to pay workers' compen-
sation benefits, and the latter is not protected 
by the immunity afforded by § 35-1-60. Bosch 
v. Busch Development, Inc., 777 P.2d 431 
(Utah 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Prejudicial effect of bringing to 
jury's attention fact that plaintiff in personal 
injury or death action ia entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits, 69 A.L.R.4th 131. 
Workers' compensation: third-party tort lia-
bility of corporate officer to injured workers, 76 
A.L.R.4th 365. 
Workers' compensation: compensability of 
injuries incurred traveling to or from medical 
treatment of earlier compensable injury, 83 
A.L.R.4th 110. 
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35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of per-
sons other than employer, officer, agent, or em-
ployee of said employer — Rights of employer or 
insurance carrier in cause of action — Mainte-
nance of action — Notice of intention to proceed 
against third party — Right to maintain action 
not involving employee-employer relationship — 
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery. 
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this 
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other 
than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured 
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the 
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an 
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and 
the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the 
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action 
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its 
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal 
representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not 
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission. 
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of 
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or 
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such 
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding. 
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Sec-
tion 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may 
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contrac-
tors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not 
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased 
employee at the time of his injury or death. 
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as 
follows: 
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, 
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their 
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier 
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the 
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third 
party. 
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed 
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and 
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1). 
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in 
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation 
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 72; C.L. 1917, L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1971, ch. 76, § 3; 1973, 
§ 3133; L. 1921, ch. 100, § 1; R.S. 1933, ch. 67, § 7; 1975, ch. 101, § 3. 
42-1-58; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-58; 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
tort-feasor prior to compensation award. 
f section 
cause of action 
f statute. 
rney fees. 
rf recovery. 
nses. 
' doctrine. 
ledies. 
iry by fellow employee. 
heirs. 
t. 
a. 
ient. 
commission, 
s fund. 
bility 
t tort-feasor prior to compen-
ward. 
•kmen's compensation claimant 
urd-party tort-feasor for sum 
' compensation award she could 
before filing compensation 
•elieve compensation insurer of 
imant award reflecting its pro-
e of attorney's fees. Graham v 
m'n, 26 Utah 2d 424, 491 P 2d 
of section. 
applies only to suits against 
are not employers or deemed to 
mployers Lamb v W-Energy, 
ipp 395 (D Utah 1987). 
f cause of action. 
d been commenced against a 
recover for the injuries or death 
ich action must first have been 
.e insurance fund as a condition 
application under Workmen's 
Act. Robinson v Industnal 
tan 203, 269 P 513 (1928). 
yee was killed in course of his 
r
 wrongful act of third person, 
>e to claim compensation under 
3 Compensation Act, but her 
>se to sue under former section, 
i widow declined to join, as as-
use of action by widow to em-
ficient, an assignment by the 
necessary An assignment was 
y when compensation was 
claimed from the employer or his insurance 
earner Brainard's Cottonwood Dairy v. Indus-
tnal Comm'n, 80 Utah 159, 14 P.2d 212, 88 
A.L.R. 659 (1935) 
It was a condition precedent to the em-
ployee's nght to claim compensation from his 
employer, where he was injured by negligence 
of someone not his employer, that he should 
assign his action for damages against the 
wrongdoer Industnal Comm'n v. Wasatch 
Grading Co , 80 Utah 223, 14 P 2d 988 (1932). 
Construction of statute. 
This section covers both active and passive 
negligence Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 
107 Utah 114, 152 P2d 98 (1944). 
Where state insurance fund paid compensa-
tion to injured person, the insurance earner 
has a cause of action where the injury was 
caused by third person; but this does not mean 
that it had the only cause of action since this 
section also gives the injured person a cause of 
action against the third person. Rogalski v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 3 Utah 2d 203, 282 
P.2d 304 (1955) 
Costs and attorney fees. 
State supreme court decisions that permit 
reasonable attorney fees to be deducted from 
that portion of recovery gained to reimburse 
state insurance fund do not apply retroactively 
to fees determined in reliance on the former 
rule Draper v Travelers Ins. Co., 429 F 2d 44 
(10th Cir 1970), Williams v Utah State Dep't 
of Fin , 23 Utah 2d 438, 464 P.2d 596 (1970). 
Although insurer was entitled to reimburse-
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ment of payment made to injured employee 
who subsequently recovered from third party, 
equitable considerations required it to pay its 
proportionate share of attorney's fees incurred 
by injured employee in obtaining judgment 
against third party Worthen v Shurtleff & 
Andrews, Inc, 19 Utah 2d 80, 426 P 2d 223 
(1967) 
State insurance fund (Workers' Compensa-
tion Fund) was required to bear its pro rata 
share of reasonable attorney fees incurred by 
claimant in obtaining settlement with third 
party inasmuch as defendant insurance fund 
was relieved from burden of paying award to 
claimant Prettyman v Utah State Dep't of 
Fin, 27 Utah 2d 333, 496 P2d 89 (1972) 
Where an injured person who has collected 
workmen's compensation sues third-party tort-
feasor, both the injured person and the subro-
gated insurance earner bear their proportion-
ate share of costs and attorney fees incurred in 
obtaining recovery in tort suit Language 
added to Subdivision (2) by the 1971 amend-
ment was intended to eliminate prior uncer-
tainty and make it clear that insurer should 
bear its proportionate share, and insurer can-
not avoid its share of expenses by hiring its 
own counsel and notifying injured person of 
that fact Lanier v Pyne, 29 Utah 2d 249, 508 
P2d 38 (1973) 
Disbursement of recovery. 
—Medical expenses. 
Commission properly interpreted the phrase 
"any obligation" in Subsection (3) to include 
medical expenses Taylor v Industnal 
Commn, 743 P2d 1183 (Utah 1987) 
"Dual capacity" doctrine. 
Utah law does not recognize as an exception 
to the exclusive remedy provisions of the 
Workers' Compensation Act the so-called "dual 
capacity' doctrine under which an employer, 
shielded from tort liability by the act, mav be-
come liable in tort if he occupies, in addition to 
his capacity as employer, a second capacity 
that confers on him an obligation independent 
of those imposed on him as an employer 
Worthen v Kennecott Corp, 780 F2d 856 
(10th Cir 1985) 
An employee cannot held his employer liable 
in tort for injuries resulting from the em-
ployer's maintenance of unsafe premises, on 
the reasoning that the employer occupies a sep-
arate capacity and owes separate duties to his 
employees as an owner of the premises, since 
the employer's duty to maintain a safe work 
place is inseparable from the employers gen-
eral duties as an employer toward his em-
ployees Bingham v Lagoon Corp, 707 P 2d 
678 (Utah 1985) 
Election of remedies. 
Where city policeman was injured by third 
person, and city paid policeman compensation 
in form of wages, action by policeman against 
third person which was dismissed without prej-
udice, commenced prior to assignment of cause 
of action to city, was not an election so as to bar 
policeman's subsequent claim for compensa-
tion from city Salt Lake City v Industnal 
Comm'n, 81 Utah 213, 17 P2d 239 (1932) 
Employee of railroad was not precluded from 
filing claim for compensation by application 
filed under Federal Employers' Liability Act 
on ground of election since employee did not 
have two remedies but only one, if injury was 
incurred while he was engaged in interstate 
commerce his remedy was under Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, if not, it was under state 
act Utah Idaho Cent RR v Industrial 
Comm'n, 84 Utah 364, 35 P 2d 842, 94 A.L.R. 
1423 (1933) 
In a case in which fireman was killed by col-
lapse of a ladder while in the performance of 
his duty, his dependents could exercise their 
right to elect under terms of this section to pur-
sue their remedy against third-party wrong-
doer Hamilton v Commission of Fin, 108 
Utah 574, 162 P2d 758 (1945) 
Intentional injury by fellow employee. 
One who is injured by the intentional act of a 
fellow employee may seek recovery for dam-
ages as provided for in this section Bryan v 
Utah Int'l, 533 P 2d 892 (Utah 1975) 
Joint venture. 
Construction company obtained contract to 
construct diversion tunnel at dam and entered 
into agreement with corporation by which the 
two organizations would unite their efforts to 
complete such construction and share m profits 
or losses from the enterprise Miner, hired by 
the construction company, who was injured 
while working on the tunnel, and who obtained 
workmen's compensation benefits, could not 
sue corporation for alleged negligence of corpo-
rate employees since the two companies were 
regarded as the employing unit The employees 
of both companies were engaged in the same 
employment Cook v Peter Kiewit Sons Co, 15 
Utah 2d 20, 386 P2d 616 (1963) 
Nondependent heirs. 
Legislature did not intend to divest the nght 
of heirs to damages under the wrongful death 
statute if they are nondependents and received 
no compensation benefits Ohveras v Caribou-
Four Corners, Inc , 598 P 2d 1320 (Utah 1979) 
Pleadings. 
Complaint by assignee should allege pay-
ment of the award Johanson v Cudahy Pack-
ing Co, 101 Utah 219, 120 P2d 281 (1941) 
Complaint was sufficient to state a cause of 
action for negligence in action by dependents of 
a truck driver who was killed when he backed 
a truck into some high tension electric wires 
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delivering a load of salt to defendant 
ng company, which salt defendant had or-
from deceased's employer. Johanson v 
hy Packing Co, 107 Utah 114, 152 P2d 
944). 
bursement 
te insurance fund (Workers' Compensa-
'und) is entitled to be reimbursed not only 
lat has been paid to the injured employee 
»time of the trial, but also for any addi-
[ sum that it was legally obligated to pay 
trial Comm'n v. Wasatch Grading Co., 80 
223, 14 P.2d 988 (1932). 
ired employee's settlement and release 
us private insurance earner, under unin-
motonst coverage, did not affect claim of 
insurance fund (Workers' Compensation 
I against third-party tort-feasor and m-
empioyee was not required to reimburse 
or workmen's compensation benefits paid 
m. Southeast Furn. Co. v. Barrett, 24 
2d 24, 465 P2d 346 (1970). 
rd party was not entitled to have amount 
gment awarded injured employee reduced 
lount of workmen's compensation benefits 
to employee; third party's contentions 
•mployer also was negligent, that msur-
:ompany stood in shoes of employer and 
juently that insurer should not recover 
nt of compensation paid injured employee 
ad. Texaco, Inc. v. Pruitt, 396 F.2d 237 
Cir. 1968). 
purpose of the right of reimbursement 
ished by this section is only to prevent 
» recovery by the employee or his or her 
dents. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Bliss, 725 P.2d 
(Utah 1986). 
npensation. 
mpensation", within the meaning of this 
n, is limited to amounts claimed by the 
yee or the dependents Allstate Ins Co. 
ss, 725 P 2d 1330 (Utah 1986) 
fixed payment made under 
-68(2)(a), when it is determined that a 
ted employee had no dependents, is not 
ensation" within the meaning of this sec-
nd where the decedent's parents sued the 
asor and its insurer, the insurance fund 
neither invade the parents' recovery nor 
i a separate claim against the insurer in 
to recover the amount paid into the Sec-
jury Fund. Allstate Ins. Co. v Bliss, 725 
330 (Utah 1986) 
employment 
,her subcontractor placing timbers in 
of large building nor materialmen sup-
scaffolding for use in construction was 
ad "in the same employment" as em-
of general construction contractor for 
lg within meaning of this section Peter-
son v Fowler, 27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P.2d 997 
(1972). 
Employee of electrical subcontractor was "in 
the same employment" as general contractor 
and not entitled to maintain action under this 
section where general contractor maintained 
right to supervision or control over subcontrac-
tor by supervising overall continuity and inte-
gration of work among various subcontractors, 
directing the sequence of work by the subcon-
tractors, making changes in the work done by 
them and ordenng work stoppages; decedent's 
only remedy was under Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. Adamson v. Okland Constr. Co., 29 
Utah 2d 286, 508 P.2d 805 (1973). 
Where decedent employee of general contrac-
tor was electrocuted, allegedly through negli-
gence of subcontractor, in accident occumng 
pnor to 1975 amendment of this section, sub-
contractor was in same employment as dece-
dent under § 35-1-42, and heirs were pre-
cluded from maintaining wrongful death ac-
tion against it by provisions of § 35-1-60. 
Shupe v. Wasatch Elec. Co., 546 P.2d 896 
(Utah 1976). 
Where plaintiffs decedent and another were 
fellow employees at time of accident, this sec-
tion prohibited action by plaintiff against the 
fellow employee and similarly prohibited the 
defendant from joining the fellow employee as 
a joint tort-feasor for purposes of contnbution. 
Phillips v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 
1980) 
Settlements. 
—Approval of commission. 
This section does not require that the com-
mission approve employee-initiated settle-
ments The commission is required to approve 
employer-initiated settlements in order to pro-
tect the interest of the employee and prevent 
the employer from entenng into a settlement 
that places the employer's welfare above that 
of the employee. That concern is not present 
when it is the employee who settles the suit. 
Taylor v. Industnal Comm'n, 743 P.2d 1183 
(Utah 1987) 
State insurance fund. 
State insurance fund (Workers' Compensa-
tion Fund) had no nght to recover for compen-
sation benefits paid out of that part of a wrong-
ful death recovery due to heirs who had re-
ceived no workmen's compensation benefits. 
Ohveras v Canbou-Four Corners, Inc., 598 
P 2d 1320 (Utah 1979). 
Subrogation. 
Where employee's onginal injury was aggra-
vated by physician's malpractice, insurance 
earner was subrogated to employee's action 
against the physician, but if a greater amount 
was recovered than that paid employee in com-
pensation, the employee was entitled to it. 
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Baker v. Wycoff, 95 Utah 199, 79 P.2d 77 
(1938). 
Third-party liability. 
Fact that defendant owned ore stockpile did 
not make defendant a possessor of the land and 
thereby liable as third party under this section 
for death of contractor's employee caused by 
unsafe condition of stockpile. Stevens v. Colo-
rado Fuel & Iron, 24 Utah 2d 214, 469 P.2d 3 
(1970). 
Employee of a masonry subcontractor whose 
work was subject to the control of the general 
contractor was an employee of general contrac-
tor for purposes of this section and was not en-
titled to recover m tort against the general 
contractor. Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 27 Utah 
2d 155, 493 P.2d 994 (1972). 
Cited in Smith v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 814 
F.2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa-
tion § 983 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Uninsured motorist coverage: va-
lidity and effect of policy provision purporting 
to reduce coverage by amount paid under 
workmen's compensation law, 24 A.L.R.3d 
1369. 
Right to maintain malpractice suit against 
injured employee's attending physician not-
withstanding receipt of workmen's compensa-
tion award, 28 A.L.R.3d 1066. 
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
«=» 2158. 
35-1-63. Judgments in favor of commission — Preference. 
All judgments obtained in any action prosecuted by the commission or by 
the state under the authority of this title shall have the same preference 
against the assets of the employer as claims for taxes. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 74; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3135; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-59. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Extent of preference. 
Judgment meeting requirements of this sec-
tion is only given a preference equal to the 
preference of tax claims in distribution of as-
sets and is not given same status as a tax lien; 
accordingly, judgment of Industrial Commis-
sion for insurance premium is not entitled to 
be paid out of proceeds of sale of mortgaged 
real estate ahead of prior mortgagee. Local Re-
alty Co. v. Steele, 90 Utah 468, 62 P.2d 558 
(1936). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa-
tion & 638. 
Key Numbers. —- Workers' Compensation 
•» 1765. 
35-1-64. Compensation — None for first three days after 
injury unless disability extended. 
No compensation shall be allowed for the first three days after the injury is 
received, except the disbursements hereinafter authorized for medical, nurse 
and hospital services, and for medicines and funeral expenses, provided, how-
ever, if the period of total temporary disability lasts more than fourteen days, 
compensation shall also be payable for the first three days after the injury is 
received. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — "Dual capacity doctrine" as basis 
for employee's recovery for medical malprac-
tice from company medical personnel, 73 
A.L.R.4th 115. 
Workers' compensation: third-party tort lia-
bility of corporate officer to injured workers, 76 
A.L.R.4th 365. 
Workers1 compensation statute as barring il-
legally employed minor's tort action, 77 
A.L.R.4th 844. 
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of per-
sons other than employer, officer, agent, or em-
ployee of said employer — Rights of employer or 
insurance carrier in cause of action — Mainte-
nance of action — Notice of intention to proceed 
against third party — Right to maintain action 
not involving employee-employer relationship — 
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Statutory employers. 
The legislature has, in clear and unmistak-
able language, evinced an intention to allow 
suits by an injured worker against those per-
sons who might be his or her statutory em-
ployers as defined in § 35-1-42. The immedi-
ate, or common-law, employer, who actually 
pays compensation, and its officers, agents, 
and employees are shielded by the exclusive 
remedy immunity conferred by § 35-1-60. Pate 
v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428 (Utah 
1989) 
The decision in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co, 
777 P 2d 428 (Utah 1989), holding that the 
state Workers' Compensation Act should no 
longer be construed to provide tort immunity 
to statutory employers who have not been re-
quired to pay benefits thereunder to the in-
jured worker, should be given retroactive ef-
fect. Lamb v. W-Energy, Inc., 884 F.2d 1349 
(10th Cir. 1989) (reversing Lamb v. W-Energy, 
Inc., 663 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah 1987), which 
appears under "Applicability of section" catch-
line in bound volume) 
A worker can sue a statutory employer who 
has not been required to pay workers' compen-
sation benefits, and the latter is not protected 
by the immunity afforded by § 35-1-60 Bosch 
v. Busch Development, Inc., 777 P2d 431 
(Utah 1989) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Prejudicial effect of bringing to 
jury's attention fact that plaintiff in personal 
injury or death action is entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits, 69 A.L.R.4th 131. 
Workers' compensation: third-party tort lia-
bility of corporate officer to injured workers, 76 
A.L.R.4th 365. 
Workers' compensation compensability of 
injuries incurred traveling to or firom medical 
treatment of earlier compensable injury, 83 
A.L.R.4th 110. 
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ADDENDUM 2 
Utah Liability Reform Act 
§ 78-27-37 to § 78-27-43 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 78-27-37 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Release «= 25 et seq. 
78-27-35. Release, settlement, or statement by injured per-
son — Notice of rescission or disavowal. 
Notice of cancellation or notice disavowing a statement, if given by mail, is 
given when it is deposited in a mailbox, properly addressed with postage 
prepaid. Notice of cancellation given by the injured person need not take a 
particular form and is sufficient if it indicates by any form of written expres-
sion the intention of the injured person not to be bound by the settlement 
agreement, liability release, or disavowed statement. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 4. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. JUT. 2d § 14 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 76 C.J.S. § 38 et seq. 
78-27-36- Right of rescission or disavowal of release, set-
tlement, or statement by injured person in addi-
tion to other provisions. 
The rights provided by this act are intended to be in addition to, and not in 
lieu of, any rights of rescission, rules of evidence, or provisions otherwise 
existing in the law. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 5. 
Meaning of "this act". — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to § 78-27-36. 
78-27-37, Definitions. 
As used in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who is 
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission 
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a 
person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in all 
its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, 
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and 
misuse, modification or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or 
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is 
authorized to act as legal representative. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-37, enacted by L. acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 1, relating to 
1986, ch. 199, § 1. diminishment of damages and assumption of 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, risk, and reenacts the above section, 
ch. 1989, § 1 repeals former § 78-27-37, as en-
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78-27-38 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-27-38. Comparative negligence-
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by that 
person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose 
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking 
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to 
that defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-38, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 2. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch. 199, § 2 repeals former § 78-27-38, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 2, relating to 
special verdicts, and reenacts the above sec-
tion. 
ANALYSIS 
Assumption of risk. 
Bailment. 
Causation. 
Jury instructions. 
Last clear chance. . 
Unit method of determining negligence. 
Cited. 
Assumption of risk. 
"Assumption of risk," i.e., risk of a known 
danger voluntarily assumed, may amount to a 
lack of due care constituting negligence; where 
such is the case and the party assuming the 
risk is the plaintiff in an action governed by 
comparative negligence statute, he is charge-
able with contributory negligence and is liable 
to have his recovery reduced or denied in accor-
dance with its provisions. Rigtrup v. Straw-
berry Water Users Ass'n, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 
1977). 
Assumption of risk language is not appropri-
ate to describe the various concepts previously 
dealt with under that terminology but is to be 
treated, in its secondary sense, as contributory 
negligence; when the issue is raised attention 
should be focused on whether a reasonably pru-
dent man in the exercise of due care would 
have incurred the risk, despite his knowledge 
of it, and if so, whether he would have con-
ducted himself in the manner in which the per-
son seeking to recover acted in light of ail the 
surrounding circumstances, including the ap-
preciated risk; then, if the unreasonableness of 
the person seeking to recover is viewed to be 
less than that of the person from whom recov-
ery is sought, any damages allowed should be 
diminished in proportion to the amount of neg-
ligence attributable to the person recovering. 
Cross-References. — Product Liability Act, 
manufacturer or seller not liable if alteration 
or modification of product after sale is substan-
tial contributing cause of injury, § 78-15-5. 
Skiers not to make claim against or recover 
from ski area operator for injury resulting from 
any inherent risk of skiing, § 78-27-53. 
Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Structo-Lite Eng'g, 
Inc., 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980). 
As used in § 78-27-37, "assumption of risk" 
is a voluntary and unreasonable exposure to a 
known danger. Moore v. Burton Lumber & 
Hdwe. Co., 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 1981). 
Bailment 
The comparative negligence statutes do not 
change the rule that the negligence of a bailee 
in handling the bailed property is not imputed 
to the bailor. Otto v. Leany, 635 P.2d 410 
(Utah 1981). 
Causation. 
Trial court committed prejudicial error in 
submitting to jury question of plaintiffs com-
parative negligence where his act of alleged 
negligence did not in any way contribute to his 
injury, although it may have increased sever-
ity of damages; comparative negligence be-
comes a defense for defendant where plaintiffs 
negligent conduct was a contributing factor in 
causing injury. Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 
P.2d 728 (Utah 1984). 
Jury instructions. 
If requested, a trial court must inform the 
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning 
to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence it 
finds in a comparative negligence case, if the 
effect of such an instruction will not be to con-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 78-27-39 
or mislead the jury. Dixon v. Stewart, 658 
591 (Utah 1982). 
t clear chance. 
ith the adoption of the Comparative Negli-
:e Act, the doctrine of last clear chance as a 
net tort doctrine was extinguished along 
> contributory negligence; however, argu-
t to the jury as to whether a party may or 
not have had the last clear chance to avoid 
ry is not precluded, and as bearing on 
:h party was guilty of the greater negli-
:e, last clear chance becomes just one of 
y factors to be weighed in the comparison. 
>n v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). 
Unit method of determining negligence. 
In a medical malpractice case, the "Wiscon-
sin" method of determining comparative negli-
gence, whereby each defendant's negligence is 
compared against the plaintiffs, was rejected 
in favor of the "unit" method whereby the neg-
ligence of all the defendants is taken together 
in making the comparison. Jensen v. Inter-
mountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903 
(Utah 1984). 
Cited in Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 
(Utah 1979). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
tan Law Review. — Note, A Primer on 
lages Under the Utah Wrongful Death and 
rival Statutes, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 519. 
)mment, McGinn v. Utah Power & Light 
— Jury Blindfolding in Comparative Neg-
nce Cases, 1975 Utah L. Rev. 569. 
>me Thoughts on the Use of Comparisons 
roducts Liability Cases, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 
New Perspective — Has Utah Entered the 
ntieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981 Utah L. 
. 495, 496. 
ulherin v. Ingersoli: Utah Adopts Compar-
e Principles in Strict Products Liability 
BS, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 461. 
righam Young Law Review. — The 
ger of Comparative Fault Principles with 
ct Liability in Utah: Mulherin v. Ingersoll-
d Co., 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 964, 966. 
m. Jur. 2d. — 57 Am. Jur. 2d § 426 et seq. 
.J.S. — 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 169 et 
A.L.R. — Comparative negligence rule 
where misconduct of three or more persons is 
involved, 8 A.L.R.3d 722. 
Retrospective application of state statute 
substituting rule of comparative negligence for 
that of contributory negligence, 37 A.L.R.3d 
1438. 
Indemnity or contribution between joint tort-
feasors on basis of relative fault, 53 A.L.R.3d 
184. 
Modern development of comparative negli-
gence doctrine having applicability to negli-
gence actions generally, 78 A.L.R.3d 339. 
Application of comparative negligence doc-
trine, generally, 86 A.L.R.3d 1206. 
Comparative negligence doctrine applied to 
actions based on strict liability in tort, 9 
A.L.R.4th 633. 
Effect of adoption of comparative negligence 
rules on assumption of risk and contributory 
negligence, 16 A.L.R.4th 700. 
Key Numbers. — Negligence *=» 97 et seq. 
-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages and 
proportion of fault. 
.Tie trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury, 
,ny, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of dam-
ss sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each 
son seeking recovery and to each defendant. 
istory: C. 1953, 78-27-39, enacted by L. 
6, ch. 199, § 3. 
epeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
199, § 3 repeals former § 78-27-39, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 3, relating to 
contribution among joint tortfeasors, and reen-
acts the above section. 
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78-27-40 JUDICIAL CODE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Jury instructions. 
If requested, a trial court must inform the 
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning 
to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence it 
finds in a comparative negligence case, if the 
effect of such an instruction will not be to con-
fuse or mislead the jury Dixon v Stewart, 658 
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). 
78-27-40, Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault 
— No contribution. 
Subject to § 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant may be 
liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the 
damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that 
defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other person. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-40, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 4. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch. 199, § 4 repeals former § 78-27-40, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 4, relating to 
settlement by a joint tortfeasor, and reenacts 
the above section. 
Cross-References. — Enforcement of con-
tribution and reimbursement, Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 69(h) 
Joint obligations, § 15-4-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Indemnity contract. 
Plaintiffs minor child as joint tortfeasor. 
Workmen's compensation. 
Indemnity contract. 
The former comparative negligence provi-
sions did not invalidate an employer's indem-
nity contract with a third party whereby em-
ployer agreed to indemnify the third party 
against claims arising out of injuries to the em-
ployer's employees. Shell Oil Co. v. Bnnker-
hoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187 (Utah 
1983). 
Plaintiffs minor child as joint tortfeasor. 
Where plaintiff was awarded a judgment in 
action against a defendant to recover the prop-
erty loss sustained as the result of a collision 
between automobiles operated by defendant 
and the minor unemancipated daughter of the 
plaintiff, and where the daughter's negligence 
contributed to the property loss sustained by 
her father, the minor daughter was a joint tort-
feasor and liable to the defendant for contribu-
tion. Bishop v Nielsen, 632 P 2d 864 (Utah 
1981). 
Workmen's compensation. 
Employer cannot be a joint tortfeasor as to 
an injury to his employee covered by the Work-
men's Compensation Act. Curtis v. Harmon 
Elec, Inc., 552 P 2d 117 (Utah 1976); Phillips 
v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P 2d 153 (Utah 1980). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah Al-
lows Contribution Against Cotortfeasor De-
spite Immunity from Direct Suit: Bishop v, 
Nielsen, 1982 B.Y U L. Rev 429. 
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 78-27-43 
i-27-41. Joinder of defendants. 
\ person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation, 
ly join as parties any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the 
ury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of having 
termmed their respective proportions of fault. 
listory: C. 1953, 78-27-41, enacted by L. acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 5, relating to 
K5, ch. 199, § 5. rights of contribution and indemnity, and reen-
lepeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, acts the above section. 
199, § 5 repeals former § 78-27-41, as en-
1-27-42. Release to one defendant does not discharge 
other defendants. 
k release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does 
t discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides. 
listory: C. 1953, 78-27-42, enacted by L. 
16, ch. 199, § 6. 
tepeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
199, § 6 repeals former § 78-27-42, as en-
Lm. JUT. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur 2d § 35 et seq 
J.J.S. — 76 C.J S § 38 et seq. 
L.L.R. — Tortfeasor's general release of co-
tfeasor as affecting former's right of contn-
lon against cotortfeasor, 34 A.L.R.3d 1374 
Release of one responsible for injury as af-
,ing liability of physician or surgeon for 
[hgent treatment of injury, 39 A.L R 3d 260 
Voluntary payment into court of judgment 
listory: C. 1953, 78-27-43, enacted by L. 
16, ch. 199, § 7. 
Lepeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
199, § 7 repeals former § 78-27-43. as en-
2d by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 7, relating to 
sase of joint tortfeasors and contribution, 
I reenacts the above section. 
everability Clauses. — Laws 1986, ch. 
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 6, relating to 
release of joint tortfeasors and a reduction of 
claim, and reenacts the above section. 
against one joint tortfeasor as release of others, 
40 A.L.R.3d 1181. 
Release of one negligently treating injury as 
affecting liability of one originally responsible 
for injury, 64 A.L.R.3d 839. 
Validity and effect of agreement with one 
cotortfeasor setting aside his maximum liabil-
ity and providing for reduction or extinguish-
ment thereof relative to recovery against non-
agreeing cotortfeasor, 65 A.L.R.3d 602. 
199, § 9 provided: "If any provision of 
§§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43, or the applica-
tion of any provisions of those sections to any 
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the re-
maining provisions of those sections shall be 
given effect without the invalid provision or 
application " 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
i-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indem-
nity, contribution. 
Nothing in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any common 
v or statutory immunity from liability, including, but not limited to, gov-
imental immunity as provided in Chapter 30, Title 63, and the exclusive 
nedy provisions of Chapter 1, Title 35. Nothing in §§ 78-27-37 through 
-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution arising 
m statute, contract, or agreement. 
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78-27-37 JUDICIAL CODE 
contract negotiations were conducted by tele-
phone calls to Salt Lake City, where the con-
tract was ultimately drafted and signed. 
Romney v St. John Virgin Grand Villas 
Assocs., 734 F Supp 957 (D. Utah 1990). 
Paternity su i t 
A nonresident submits himself to the juris-
diction of the Utah courts in a paternity suit 
for the purpose of establishing responsibility 
for child support when he has engaged in sex-
ual intercourse within the state. By negative 
implication, it follows that when the inter-
course occurs outside the state, the legislature 
did not intend to subject the nonresident to 
Utah jurisdiction in the absence of other con-
tacts by him with the state. Baldwin v. 
Easterlmg, 754 P 2d 942 (Utah 1988). 
Plaintiff, who was impregnated in Pennsyl-
vania before returning to her mother's home in 
Utah, could not '"bootstrap" her paternity 
claim upon a separate misrepresentation 
claim, where her paternity claim did not "arise 
from" any misrepresentation regarding defen-
dant's promise to pay hw ratvarn an fare to 
Pennsylvania and to support her and the child. 
Baldwin v Easterlmg, 754 P2d 942 (Utah 
1988). 
Proof of jurisdiction. 
When a plaintiff makes a prima facie show-
ing that the defendants have sufficient con-
tacts with Utah and this litigation for asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction consistent with 
COLLATERAL 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Civil Pro-
cedure, 1989 Utah L. Rev 166. 
Note, Parry v Ernst Home Center Corpora-
tion. The "Mauling" of Personal Jurisdiction 
Theory, 1990 Utah L. Rev 479 
A.L.R. — Products liability- personal juris-
78-27-37. Definitions. 
NOTES TO 
Cited in Deats v Commercial Sec. Bank, 
746 P2d 1191 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
COLLATERAL 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — For 
comment, 'The Liability Reform Act* An Ap-
proach to Equitable Application," see 13 J. 
Contemp L 89 (1987) 
due process, then requiring the defendants to 
subject themselves to trial in a Utah court for 
the purpose of determining whether the plain-
tiff could prove jurisdiction was proper. Ander-
son v. American Soc'y of Plastic Surgeons, 148 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1990) 
Transaction of any business. 
—Business losses. 
The place where business was lost reflects 
the economic reality of impact injury in the 
case of commercial torts. Loss of profits within 
a state in which a place of business is main-
tained simply is an insufficient basis on which 
to find that the injury occurred within that 
state as compared with the impact of actual 
business lost in another state. STV Int'l Mktg. 
v. Cannondale Corp., 750 F Supp. 1070 (D 
Utah 1990). 
Federal district court lacked jurisdiction in 
an action against a Delaware corporation for 
breach of contract and tortious interference 
with economic relationships, where the alleged 
business losses occurred in Europe, and con-
tacts with \3tah were not on\y re\ative\y mi-
nuscule in quantity but were tangential to the 
parties' relationship STV Intl Mktg. v 
Cannondale Corp , 750 F Supp. 1070 (D Utah 
1990). 
Cited in Lister v Marangom Meccanica, 728 
F. Supp. 1524 (D Utah 1990), Anderson v 
American Soc'y of Plastic Surgeons, 148 Utah 
Adv Rep. 3 (1990). 
REFERENCES 
diction over nonresident manufacturer of com-
ponent incorporated in another product, 69 
A.L.R.4th 14. 
In personam jurisdiction, in libel and slander 
action, over nonresident who mailed allegedly 
defamatory letter from outside state, 83 
A.L.R.4th 1006. 
DECISIONS 
REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Liability to one struck by golf ball, 
53 A L.R.4th 282. 
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 78-27-40 
78-27-38. Comparative negligence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Assumption of risk. 
Jury instructions. 
Open and obvious danger. 
Wrongful death. 
Cited. 
Assumption of risk. 
Assumption of risk language is not appropri-
ate in an instruction under comparative negli-
gence statutes. Stephens v. Henderson, 741 
P.2d 952 (Utah 1987) (applying statute in ef-
fect pnor to 1986). 
The assumption of risk doctrine has been ex-
pressly abandoned in Utah as a complete bar to 
recovery due to its incompatibility with the 
comparative negligence system. Donahue v. 
Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Jury instructions. 
Instruction that "ordinarily, a plaintiff in 
any action has the duty of seeing and avoiding, 
if reasonable, a hazard which is plainly visible, 
and if the plaintiff [unreasonably] failed to do 
so, then the plaintiff is negligent either in fail-
ing to look or in failing to heed what he or she 
saw/* when read together with all of the other 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — For 
comment, T h e Liability Reform Act: An Ap-
proach to Equitable Application," 13 J 
Contemp. L. 89 (1987). 
AX.R. — Commercial renter's negligence li-
ability for customer's personal injuries, 57 
A.L.R.4th 1186. 
Liability to one struck by golf club, 63 
A.L.R.4th 221. 
Liability for injury incurred in operation of 
power golf cart, 66 A.L.R.4th 622. 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability of section. 
Cited. 
Applicability of section. 
A statute, such as this section, eliminating 
instructions given on negligence, was a correct 
statement of a plaintiffs duty in negligence ac-
tion. Deats v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 746 P.2d 
1191 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 
P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988). 
Open and obvious danger. 
By establishing a comparative negligence 
system, the legislature has by necessary impli-
cation abolished the open and obvious danger 
rule as an absolute bar to an injured guest's 
recovery. Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Wrongful death. 
The 1973 legislation that abolished the com-
mon-law contributory negligence defense and 
made comparative negligence the governing 
tort principle did not overrule pre-1973 case 
law construing the term "wrongful" in the 
wrongful death statute nor did it free a wrong-
ful death plaintiff from the imputation of any 
negligent conduct of the decedent. Kelson v 
Salt Lake County, 784 P 2d 1152 (Utah 1989). 
Cited in Warren v. Honda Motor Co., 669 F. 
Supp. 365 (D. Utah 1987); Western Fiberglass, 
Inc. v Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 789 P 2d 
34 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Tort liability for window washer's injury or 
death, 69 A.L.R.4th 207. 
Comparative fault: calculation of net recov-
ery by applying percentage of plaintiffs fault 
before or after subtracting amount of settle-
ment by less than all joint tortfeasors, 71 
A.L.R.4th 1108. 
Rescue doctrine: applicability and applica-
tion of comparative negligence principles, 75 
A.L.R.4th 875. 
injuries occurring pnor to its effective date. 
Where the injuries occurred on November 8, 
1984, and the Liability Reform Act was not 
effective until April 28, 1986, the trial court 
was correct in holding that the Liability Re-
form Act did not apply. SteDhens v Ut>nA*~>~~ 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-27-40, Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault 
— No contribution. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
78-27-41 JUDICIAL CODE 
Cited in Warren v. Honda Motor Co., 669 F. 
Supp. 365 (D. Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — For from medical attendant aggravating injury or 
comment, "The Liability Reform Act: An Ap- causing new injury in course of treatment, 72 
proach to Equitable Application," see 13 J. A.LJL4th 231. 
Contemp. L. 89 (1987). Products liability: seller's right to indemnity 
A.L.R. — Right of tortfeasor initially caus- from manufacturer, 79 A.L.R.4th 278. 
ing injury to recover indemnity or contribution 
78-27-41. Joinder of defendants. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Products liability: seller's nght to 
indemnity from manufacturer, 79 A.L.R.4th 
278. 
78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indem-
nity, contribution. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Right of tortfeasor initially caus- causing new injury in course of treatment, 72 
ing injury to recover indemnity or contribution A.L.R4th 231. 
from medical attendant aggravating injury or Products liability: seller's nght to indemnity 
from manufacturer, 79 A.L.R.4th 278. 
78-27-44. Personal injury judgments — Interest autho-
rized. 
(1) In all actions brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained 
by any person, resulting from or occasioned by the tort of any other person, 
corporation, association, or partnership, whether by negligence or willful in-
tent of that other person, corporation, association, or partnership, and 
whether that injury shall have resulted fatally or otherwise, the plaintiff in 
the complaint may claim interest on the special damages actually incurred 
from the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action. 
(2) It is the duty of the court, in entering judgment for plaintiff in that 
action, to add to the amount of special damages actually incurred that are 
assessed by the verdict of the jury, or found by the court, interest on that 
amount calculated at the legal rate, as defined in Section 15-1-1, from the date 
of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action to the date of 
entering the judgment, and to include it in that judgment. 
(3) As used in this section, "special damages actually incurred" does not 
include damages for future medical expenses, loss of future wages, or loss of 
future earning capacity. 
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AN ACT RELATING TO THE JUDICIAL CODE; MODIFYING PROVISIONS RELATING TO 
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE; SPECIFYING DUTIES OF JURORS AND JUDGES; 
ABOLISHING JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY AND RIGHTS OF CONTRIBUTION 
AMONG DEFENDANTS; REQUIRING FAULT OF DEFENDANTS TO BE DETERMINED IN 
ONE TRIAL; AND DEFINING CERTAIN TERMS. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
78-27-53, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 166, LAWS OF UTAH 1979 
REPEALS AND REENACTS: 
SUBSTITUTE S. B, No- 64 01-31-86 4:54 PM 
1 78-27-37, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973 
2 78-27-38, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973 
3 78-27-39, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973 
4 78-27-40, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973 
5 78-27-41, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973 
6 78-27-42, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973 
7 78-27-43, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973 
8 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
9 Section 1. Section 78-27-37, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
10 Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read: 
11 78-27-37, As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
12 (1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who is claimed 
13 to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery. 
14 (2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or 
15 omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained 
16 by a person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in 
17 all its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict 
18 liability, breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products 
19 liability, and misuse, modification or abuse of a product, 
20 (3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or 
21 reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is 
22 authorized to act as legal representative, 
23 Section 2. Section 78-27-38, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
24 Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read: 
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1 78-27-38. The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar 
2 recovery by that person. He may recover from any defendant or group of 
3 defendants whose fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to 
4 any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of 
5 fault attributable to that defendant. 
6 Section 3. Section 78-27-39, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
7 Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read: 
8 78-27-39. The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, 
9 direct the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the 
10 total amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault 
11 attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to 
12 each other person whose fault contributed to the injury or damages. 
13 Section 4. Section 8-27-40, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
14 Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read: 
15 78-27-40. Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a 
16 defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage 
17 or proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of 
18 fault attributed to that defendant. No defendant is entitled to 
19 contribution from any other person. 
20 Section 5. Section 78-27-41, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
21 Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read: 
22 78-27-41. A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party 
23 to the litigation, may join as parties any defendants who may have caused 
24 or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for 
^^ the purpose of having determined their respective proportions of fault. 
SUBSTITUTE S. B. No. 64 Ul-Jl-Sb tiM m 
1 Section 6. Section 78-27-42, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
2 Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read: 
3 78-27-42. A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more 
4 defendants does not discharge any other defendant unless the release so 
5 provides. 
6 Section 7. Section 78-27-43, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
7 Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read: 
8 78-27-43. Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or 
9 impairs any common law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but 
10 not limited to, governmental immunity as provided in Chapter 30, Title 63, 
H and the exclusive remedy provisions of Chapter 1, Title 35. Nothing in 
12 Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to 
13 indemnity or contribution arising from statute, contract, or agreement. 
14 Section 8. Section 78-27-53, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
15 Chapter 166, Laws of Utah 1979, is amended to read: 
16 78-27-53. Notwithstanding anything in [section] Sections 78-27-37 
17 through 78-27-43 to the contrary, no skier [shaii] may make any claim 
18 against, or recover from, any ski area operator for injury resulting from 
19 any of the inherent risks of skiing. 
20 Section 9. If any provision of Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43, or 
21 tr.e application of any provision of those sections to any person or 
22 circumstance, is held invalid, the remaining provisions of those sections 
23 shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
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1 Section 10. This act takes effect upon approval by the governor, or 
2 the day following the constitutional time limit of Article VII, Sec. 8 
3 without the governor's signature, or in the case of a veto, the date of 
4 veto override. 
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Senator Kay S. Cornaby's letter 
dated February 4, 1986 
S E N A T E C H A M B E R 
S T A T E O F U T A H 
SALT L A K E C I T Y 
February 4, 1986 
Mr, President: 
The State and Local Standing Committee, to which was 
referred S.B. No. 64, LIABILITY REFORM ACT, by Senator Haven J. 
Barlow et al, has carefully considered the bill and reports it 
out of committee with the recommendation that the original bill 
ce deleted in body and title and that Substitute S.B. No. 64 
replace the original bill. 
Substitute S.B. No. 64 to be amended as follows: 
1. Page 3, line 11: 
After "recovery" delete 'V* and insert "and" 
2. Page 3, line 11: 
After "defendant" delete the rest of the line. 
3. Page 3, line 12: 
Line 12, delete the rest of the line except the pe 
Respectfully 
